

Party Organizer

Weinstone Collection

"The mobilization of the Party for the work in the factories and trade unions cannot be carried through on the basis of an abstract campaign. It can only be successful as part of the preparation of the Party to at once take up the fight in each factory, in each industry in the struggle, in the defense of the interests of the workers, to give leadership to developing strike struggles . . . This . . . requires that we prepare ourselves organizationally to lead these struggles; . . . to raise the confidence and fighting spirit of the workers; to develop their capacity to struggle by extending in the factories the Party and trade union organizations; to develop the united front of all workers; to build strong fighting oppositions in the A. F. of L. unions."—Lessons of Economic Struggles, Tasks of the Communists in the Trade Unions, Resolution of 8th Convention, C. P. U. S. A.

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Two Lessons from the San Francisco General Strike

THERE are many important lessons to be learned by our Party from the San Francisco General Strike, and from the West Coast marine strike which preceded it. Many of these can be drawn only after all of the events have been carefully studied. However, even today, we can point out two significant things.

First, why was it, that in spite of the fact that strikes developed in Toledo, Milwaukee and Minneapolis—militant strikes which carried with them the threat of General Strike, strikes in which we participated—these strikes were quickly broken by the combined forces of the government and the labor bureaucrats, and although the masses of workers were ready for General Strike, the bosses and the bureaucrats were able to prevent it? In contrast to these strikes, we find the longshoremen on the Pacific Coast holding out against all the attacks of the bosses, the labor bureaucracy, and the government, for a period of three months, winning the support of the other trade unions, and finally developing a General Strike to force their demands.

The answer to this question is clear. The longshoremen took the control of their strike from the hands of the labor bureaucracy and placed it in the hands of a rank-and-file leadership, which firmly resisted all of the efforts of the fakers and the government to betray it. The masses in Toledo and Milwaukee and Minneapolis were in motion, the Party played a role in all of these strikes, the workers adopted our slogans and attempted to carry them out, but were defeated by the strategy and tactics of the bosses and the bureaucrats. Why could this occur? Was it because the workers in Toledo and Milwaukee and Minneapolis were less militant, or less determined, than the longshoremen in San Francisco? No, the answer lies in the fact that in these places the Party was working from without. We did not have a firm base among the workers. But in San Francisco the Party had carried out a policy of concentration among the longshoremen, who are a decisive section of the working class, and had built a strong opposition movement within the reformist union. Consequently when the labor leaders appeared before the workers with their betrayal policy, there was a strong or-

ganized group within the union, which was able to expose their maneuvers and defeat them.

This emphasizes with new meaning the tasks set before us by the Open Letter. The Party has been slow in carrying out these tasks. We must set to work with fresh determination and energy to: "establish a firm base for our Party and for the revolutionary trade union movement among the decisive strata of the American workers in the most important industrial centers," and to carry on "systematic work in the reformist trade unions, with a view to organizing a broad revolutionary trade union opposition," bearing in mind the words of the Open Letter:

"Every Party member must now understand that it depends on correct policy, and above all, the execution of the correct policy whether we will be able to mobilize the masses of workers for struggle and whether our Party, in this historically favorable situation, will become the decisive mass Party of the American proletariat, or whether the bourgeoisie with the help of its social-fascist and fascist agents will succeed in disorganizing the mass movement and keeping it down."

The second lesson grows out of the first. That is the question of terror and the attack upon the Party and the revolutionary trade unions. In San Francisco we have seen a wave of fascist violence directed against the working class in general, and particularly against the Communists and the revolutionary trade unions, unequalled outside of fascist Germany. The whole force of the press, the courts, the State, and of all of the agents of the ruling class has been directed in the most savage onslaught against the Communist Party. With the cry of "Reds" and "outside, alien, influence," they have hoped to isolate the vanguard of the working class from the masses, in order to betray the workers and drive them into worse conditions of slavery. With a Communist Party firmly rooted in the masses, in the reformist trade unions, such an attack cannot succeed. The masses will come to the defense of the Communist Party, which they will recognize as the Party which fights for their interests.

We must come boldly before the working masses to answer this cry of "Reds" and of "subversive influence." The workers are looking to us for an answer and we must not fail them. Every Party member should read the editorial which appeared in the **Daily Worker** on July 19th, "What is the Role of the Communist Party in the Frisco General Strike," and use this in answering the attacks of our enemies, stating clearly to the workers the aims of the Communist

Party and the day-to-day struggles, as well as our ultimate goal. Our experience in numerous cases where the "Red scare" has been fearlessly and frankly met, is that we need have no fear of the "Red scare" when we explain our position to the workers.

Finally, the experiences of San Francisco bring home to us, in its sharpest form, the necessity of safeguarding our Party against attacks, of building defense corps and of taking the necessary measures to make certain that in spite of fascist attacks the Party will not lose its contact with the masses.

The Thaelmann Campaign

By ROBERT HAMILTON

THE events in Germany since June 30th indicate strikingly that a new phase in the development of the struggle against Hitler fascism has commenced. The success of the German workers' efforts, under the leadership of the Communist Party of Germany, to undermine the support Hitler has received up to now from the rank and file of the Storm Troops, is evidenced in the complete disintegration of that body of over 2,500,000 armed men as a political factor in support of the Nazi regime.

In addition, the increasingly severe economic crisis in Germany which the Nazi regime has been totally unable to lessen, much less solve, has brought about aggravation of the antagonisms within the German bourgeoisie itself.

Thus today, the Communist Party of Germany faces a situation in which it can outline a perspective of preparation for an armed uprising to seize power and establish a Soviet Germany within the not too distant future.

The Reichstag fire trial, when mass pressure both within Germany and from millions of workers and intellectuals in foreign countries forced the Nazis to acquit Dimitroff, Torgler, Taneff and Popoff, was the first major political defeat that the Nazis suffered at the hands of the world proletariat.

Hitler's second major defeat—this time at the hands of the German working class—was the two-thirds majority against his candidates in the recent shop council elections in the factories of Germany.

The third major defeat for the Hitler regime was exemplified in the murderous events of June 30th, when one faction within the Nazi party, at the orders of German big business, slaughtered another faction of the Nazi leaders.

Under these circumstances the fight for the freeing of Ernst Thaelmann involves much more than saving the life

of a heroic working class leader. If the workers of the world can get Thaelmann out of the Nazis' clutches, we will have struck a decisive blow for the final overthrow of the Nazi regime. For let us not forget that even for the Nazis themselves Thaelmann personifies the German Communist Party, which is why such desperate efforts are being made to behead him. Today, therefore, the workers of the United States must be made to realize that the fight to save Ernst Thaelmann summarizes our entire battle to overthrow the Hitlerite regime at the present time.

Around the fight for the freedom of Thaelmann we can get hundreds of thousands of workers, who are otherwise difficult to approach, into a very extensive united front lined up against German fascism. There is today, in the United States, almost unanimous hatred of everything that Hitler stands for among the working class, as well as the farmers, the intellectuals and most of the middle class. We can, therefore, if we utilize this campaign intelligently and energetically, use the campaign to free Ernst Thaelmann as the entering wedge for the establishment of the united front with sections of the population whom we cannot otherwise reach.

Up to the present time, the campaign for Thaelmann has been a Party matter to an extent which cannot be tolerated. Practically no efforts of any appreciable magnitude have been made to involve the workers organized in A. F. of L. unions in this campaign. Nor have we, in any District, made serious efforts to approach Socialist Party locals to get their support for the Free Thaelmann campaign. Up to now, all that we have done is to mobilize our own Party members, and those in mass organizations affiliated with the Party, and even that has been done to an inadequate extent.

Our campaign up to the present has consisted largely of the following methods of agitation:

1. Picketing in front of German Consulates.
2. Protest delegations to German Consuls.
3. Sending some 200,000 protest postcards to Germany.
4. Mass meetings, parades and demonstrations.
5. Special dramatic actions, such as bicycle parades, street runs, propaganda trucks through the streets, raising Thaelmann flags, and the like.
6. Protest telephone calls to the German Consulates on a mass scale.

But all this has been done largely by our Party organizations. We have made little effort and we have had even less success in spreading the Thaelmann campaign among those circles of the working class who are under A. F. of L. or Socialist Party ideological domination. And unless we succeed in doing that, we shall have failed in two important

tasks: 1. Widening the Thaelmann campaign to embrace a very large proportion of the American working class and, 2. Making use of the issues involved in this campaign to penetrate these masses with the slogan of the united front.

But that does not mean that the methods of agitation and mobilization used up to now—and listed above—should be abandoned. On the contrary, we must see to it that these methods are employed on an even wider scale from now on since the present murderous unsettled conditions in Germany offer Hitler the opportunity of murdering Thaelmann alongside the hundreds of other murders committed by his forces during the past three weeks.

Another important side of the campaign, which although launched has made but little headway up to now, is the campaign for the collection of "one million signatures and one million pennies" for the release of Ernst Thaelmann. This campaign, if properly pushed by every functionary of the Party, will involve hundreds of thousands of additional workers in our fight and in addition provide the financial resources for sending lawyers to Germany to defend Thaelmann before the "People's Courts."

We must make the American workers fully acquainted with the entire implication of these Courts as well as pointing out to them much more urgently than we have succeeded in doing up to now the imminent danger of death at a murderer's hands to which Thaelmann is exposed every single day.

Our Party owes a debt of proletarian honor to the heroic German revolutionary workers. This obligation of proletarian solidarity can be fulfilled only if we do our share as part of the world-wide campaign to effect the release of Ernst Thaelmann. Our German brother Party expects that we aid it in its determined battle to overthrow the Hitler regime. The fight for the freedom of Ernst Thaelmann is today the keystone of our entire struggle against fascism in Germany.

In conclusion, it should be pointed out that we cannot fight fascism in one country alone. The fight against German fascism will remain nothing but words unless it is made an integral part of our fight against fascist tendencies in the United States. It is wholly false to separate the fight for the freedom of the Scottsboro Boys and of Angelo Herndon from the fight for the freedom of Ernst Thaelmann and similarly, we cannot fight effectively for the freedom of Ernst Thaelmann unless we make this fight part of our arsenal for the struggle against fascism in this country.

The United Front

By G. MAUL

THE Communist Party has addressed two Open Letters to the Socialist Party inviting them to a united struggle for the most immediate and pressing needs of the workers and toiling masses, against developing fascism and imperialist war.

No answer has been received to these letters.

In the meantime the fascist terror of the Roosevelt Government is increasing. Workers demonstrating for relief in Cleveland are shot down in cold blood. Striking longshoremen, fighting for their most elementary rights and needs, are killed by the San Francisco police. And to drown in blood the general strike of San Francisco, the whole power of the State—police, deputies, national guard—has been mobilized, with the federal troops held in readiness for action. Never was the need for united action of all workers so great. Still the Socialist Party is silent.

The Communist Party believes that the rank and file of the Socialist Party honestly desires to enter into united front struggle with the Communist Party. The rank and file have been confused by the militant phrases of the Revolutionary Policy Committee and the so-called "militants," led by Thomas and Co., who were forced by the pressure of the Socialist workers to take a "Left" position. The Communist Party will fail in its revolutionary duty if it neglects to do everything within its power to weld the unity of the working class in the face of the threat of fascism and war at home and abroad, and in defense of the immediate interests of the workers. It is therefore necessary to convince the rank and file of the Socialist Party of our sincerity in making these united front proposals in order to increase the pressure upon the Socialist Party leadership to establish the united front.

In every District, in every city and locality where the Socialist Party has organizations, delegations should approach the Socialist Party with concrete proposals for united action on specific issues, for example, a united front demonstration in support of the San Francisco General Strike, for a united struggle against terror—New Jersey, Cleveland, Milwaukee, California, New York—for a united front struggle against fascism and war, for the freedom of Ernst Thaelmann, etc. These proposals should not be general, but be presented very concretely, and should be widely popularized by means of leaflets to the rank and file of the Socialist Party. Where burning local issues exist that are agitating the masses, e. g.,

a cut in relief, mass lay-offs of relief workers, etc., these issues should be included in the united front proposals.

The units and sections should not wait for specific instructions from the Districts, but should use their initiative to make these proposals to the Socialist Party branches on the major issues of war and fascism, support of the strikes and against the terror, including the local issues with which the workers are immediately concerned.

The results of these proposals, and the answer of the Socialist Party leadership should be widely popularized, by sending the news of the proposals and their acceptance or rejection to the **Daily Worker**, and also by means of leaflets issued in the localities.

We must bring to the Socialist workers the example of the successful united front which has been established in France in the struggle against war and fascism, urging them to bring pressure upon their leadership to establish the united front.

The immediate, practical unity of the working class against the attacks of the police, for the right to organize and assemble, for higher wages, for unemployment insurance, against fascism and war, is an urgent necessity. Let us show to the Socialist workers that the Communist Party is ready and eager to find the way to this unity.

Build Revolutionary Opposition In the Reformist Unions!

By L. TOTH

THE general resolution as well as the special Trade Union resolution of the Eighth Convention of our Party emphasized the importance of building the revolutionary opposition in the reformist unions.

The recent developments in the A. F. of L. make it imperative that our Party should pay very much attention to working inside it. If we take the strike struggles from the middle of May until July 1st, we will find that 90 per cent of the great struggles conducted by the American workers for increase in wages, for shorter hours, for union recognition were conducted by workers in the A. F. of L. Not in all of these strikes did our Party play a big role. We can divide the role of the Party into three categories:

First, strikes initiated by the rank and file, led by the Communist Party fraction, or rank and file opposition group under the leadership of the Party.

Second, strikes initiated by the workers where the Party stepped in during the strike and helped to crystallize the struggle and give it leadership.

Third, strike struggles where the Party was not influential in originating it, neither did the Party step in while the struggle was going on. As a matter of fact, our Party played no role whatsoever.

To overcome these weaknesses and shortcomings, we have to go further than to write beautiful resolutions or declarations on the importance of working in these unions. We have to start systematically building the revolutionary opposition groups in every local and in every shop controlled by the A. F. of L.

To build such opposition groups, our Party Districts, sections and units must have a definite plan of where and how these revolutionary oppositions should be organized. For example, each District and section should survey its territory and examine every A. F. of L. organization and the possibilities of building such opposition groups. Suppose in a certain city there are 60 local unions, the majority of them affiliated with a central labor body. We should select 10 locals and through our contacts in these local unions organize groups based on a definite program. A close check up must be made of the members in the mass organizations, many of whom, while members of revolutionary mass organizations, are also members of trade unions. Some of these members do not realize that they have certain tasks to fulfill in their respective trade union organizations. Some of them never attend meetings except when they have to pay dues, but, in many cases, they are very active members in the trade union locals and some of them are staunch supporters of the reactionary machine of their respective local unions.

Party members in the A. F. of L. unions must be the most active in the organization and must serve as an example to their fellow members. They have to participate in all phases of work. They have to bring the most constructive program before the local unions, they have to be in the forefront in the strike struggles as well as in the building of the organization.

Communists will gain the confidence of the rank-and-file members only if they will prove to them that they are the fearless and the tireless champions of the rights of the rank-and-file members.

"Red Scare"

With correct and systematic work, the corrupt officials are forced into defense. To divert the attention of the rank-and-file members from the real issues, these exposed corrupt

officials raise the "Red scare". The Communists are accused of being disrupters in unions, agents of Moscow, etc. But in a very short time the rank-and-file members supporting the Communists in their fight against the machine discover that every one who dares to criticize, who speaks up for the rights of the membership, who is opposed to gangster methods, is called by these misleaders a Communist and a Moscow agent. The Communists should not hide the face of the Party by denying that they are Communists, but, on the contrary, they should prove to the workers first, that the Communists are the ones who fearlessly expose these misleaders, and second that everyone is considered a Communist if he does likewise.

Recruiting Members To the Party

In the strike struggles as well as the everyday struggles in the local unions or the shops, the Communists gain prestige and recognition. This must be utilized by members of the Communist Party to recruit these workers into the Party. Many times this important task is overlooked by our comrades.

Organization of Fraction Work In a New York Section

WHILE we realize that our main concentration points must be the factory and shop, we should not overlook the fact that the members of our mass organizations are workers from the shops and factories and that they have contact with the workers of very important industries. To cite an example—in our section there is a unit concentrating on the B.M.T. Because of the terror and spy system in the B.M.T., it is very difficult to make a contact and it takes systematic concentration before a contact is made. Yet we found out later on that one of the B.M.T. workers is a member of an I.W.O. Branch in our territory.

The same applies to all our tasks. They could be carried out much more successfully, if the Party fractions would be established and all this work discussed and put before the mass organizations in the proper manner.

Fractions Can Be Organized

It is time that we not only speak about the importance of organizing fractions in the mass organizations, but that we give the comrades leadership and concrete examples on how to go about the work.

In our section territory, we have 80 mass organizations (including three union locals) with a membership of over 5,000 English, Jewish, Finnish and Italian speaking workers. Our Section Committee elected a comrade as fraction secretary who accepted on condition that he be permitted to build a fraction department around him which consists of the following:

Nine members, each one of whom is assigned to head all fractions and branches of a specific organization in the section, e. g., all fractions of the I.W.O. branches scattered throughout the section are responsible to one of the members of the Fraction Department.

This removes a tremendous burden from the Section executive who previously had to assist the lone Section Fraction Secretary with the numerous problems that arise within mass organizations, etc.

The Department functions as follows:

1. Each member of the Fraction Department meets with the fraction of an organization to guide, clarify issues that need attention, and improve the relation of the fraction to the organization. These can be either on a branch or Section scale.

2. Open fraction meetings are held in each organization where there is a functioning fraction. This tends to straighten out any antagonisms between the Party members and the non-Party members, by bringing in the role of the Party in relation to the organizations and abolishing the conception that the Party uses the organizations as collection agencies. Such discussion and clarification have been a source for recruiting members to the Party from these open fraction meetings.

3. Where serious problems crop up, they are immediately taken up at a special meeting together with the head of the fraction department (the Section Fraction Secretary) for proper direction.

4. When necessary, the Sub-Secretary meets with the unit in the territory of the organization involved, for cooperation between the unit and the fraction.

5. The Fraction Department meets about every six weeks to take up the immediate campaign and local struggles, discuss past activity and how to carry on the work more efficiently. Every Sub-Secretary makes a report which is discussed by the other secretaries. This enables each member of the Section Fraction Department to be familiar with the work and methods of the other.

6. In between the meetings of the Fraction Department, the Fraction Department Buro (composed of three members) meets weekly and is always available to any Party member on Monday evenings at the Section headquarters for problems

that need immediate attention. The need for this is proven by the fact that the buro is busy all evening settling problems brought in by leading fractions, etc. Before this was established, these comrades probably would not have known where to go and would most likely have approached the Section Organizer, who usually has his hands full on Monday nights and therefore could give them very little of his attention.

7. Each member of the Fraction Dept. reports on his or her work so that the Section Fraction Secretary can always check up and further direct their work, without having to wait until the department meets.

We have also issued an outline explaining how to do Party work in a mass organization, the role of a Party member in a mass organization, the functions of the Party fraction, fraction discipline, etc. Most of the units held discussions on fraction work, using this outline. Each Fraction Secretary and every Unit Buro was supplied with a copy of this outline for discussion.

Every two months, we issue a bulletin on how to politicize our work. We send this together with a list of names of those assigned to do major work in mass organizations, to the members of Fraction Dept., Fraction Secretaries and Unit Buros, to make sure that we reach those comrades who are not politically developed and do not know how to link up unit work with the work in the mass organizations.

A questionnaire was distributed to all Fraction Secretaries which supplies us with all the necessary information regarding their organizations as well as all information regarding any opponent organizations in their territory. This is an excellent means of keeping posted on what the possibilities are for extending the struggles of the workers.

When we issue a call for a conference requesting delegates from mass organizations, etc. for the purpose of organizing a branch of the League Against War and Fascism, or the Provisional Committee Against the High Cost of Living, etc., a copy of this call is given to the members of the Fraction Department who in turn take this up with the fractions so that when it is taken up in the organization, each Party member is prepared to help to have it favorably received by the organization as a whole.

In addition, we have compiled a file system that is in the hands of the Section Fraction Secretary, with all information of all fractions which enables us on short notice, to mobilize all Fraction Secretaries efficiently because we know in advance when they meet, where, etc., and therefore when available.

As a result of this work for the past six months, we now have stable fractions functioning in 45 out of the 80 mass organizations in our section, and we are making every effort to organize fractions in the remaining organizations just as quickly as possible.

We have also been able to organize new organizations such as an Italian Workers' Club, an F.S.U. Branch, etc.

In the District office of the F.S.U., it was admitted that for the first time, some one representing a Section had come to see them about the branches in its territory, and the possibilities of building new ones, the way Party members function within them, and about building fractions where there were none. If every Section organized a fraction department, they too could follow this step and so strengthen the F.S.U. in the entire District. Multiply such results by the number of organizations to which this can be applied and you have more than enough to warrant every Section having a fraction department. What better methods of contact will we have when the Party is driven underground than that of our fractions? So much more so if these fractions are well woven into a network of direct contact from the highest body down to the smallest.

Role of Section Leadership In Strike Struggles

THE resolution adopted at the Chicago, District 8, Convention has the following paragraph:

"The task of the T.U.U.L. fractions and **Party Sections** . . . is to strengthen the influence of the T.U.U.L. . . . To consistently develop leadership of the unions from among the workers. To **persistently explain to the workers** the program, tasks and tactics of the revolutionary unions and thereby systematically organize, develop and lead the existing discontent among the workers into struggles in these shops."

With this clear explanation of the role of the Party for a guide to action around our shops of concentration, one would expect to find a decisive change in methods of work, especially so short a time after the Convention.

Section 3, Chicago, has shown by example that in the Party ranks, there is as yet no clarity on the line of the Resolution.

When the Dryden Rubber workers, (2,000) walked out on strike, the Section leadership immediately issued a leaflet in the name of the Party. It was correct for the Party to "greet the strikers." But while the leaflet dealt with the

general demands of the strikers, it raised these demands with little appreciation of their immediate importance. The fact that 40 per cent of the workers were girls, and concrete demands to be raised for them, was not presented plainly enough in the leaflet.

The fact that the Employes Club (existing company union which functions as a sick benefit organization) took over the leadership of the strike, after being forced by the movement of the workers towards a strike, was not dealt with by the comrades. The fact that the company had fired the chairman (elected by the workers at the formation of the club) and placed its own man into the position was not dealt with. The fact that the A. F. of L. had discredited itself with the workers long ago was not mentioned.

The strikers were instructed by the Party leadership in Section 3 to organize into a union. Not one word was said in this leaflet, or any of the others that were issued, on the T.U.U.L. The workers were told to continue their strike for the 20 per cent increase in wages.

The Section leadership told the strikers not to accept the offer of Dryden for a 5 per cent increase—but they failed to point out that this offer was actually forced by the actions of the workers. Nor did they mention a word about the role of the Party—the role the workers in the neighborhood—the unemployed, could play in actively supporting this strike—relief, legal aid, mass support on the picket lines—these questions were not raised.

The leaflet ended with a grand gesture of the need for establishing a Soviet America “that only when this is done will we improve our conditions.” The strikers could not possibly understand this when it is raised in such a manner, but are left with the impression that strike struggles can’t help much—the only thing to do is to go back to work and wait for the Revolution.

The comrades of the Section and the Y.C.L. (which was quite active in this strike) were called in by the acting District Secretariat (this was during the National Convention) to discuss the policy in the strike. The policy outlined at this meeting was a correct one:

1. At the mass meeting called by the Company union for that night we were to present our program.
2. A leading comrade from the T.U.U.L. was assigned to work with the leading comrades of the Party and the Y.C.L. in this strike.
3. Our comrades in the shop were to win the strikers away from the influence of the company union for a union based on representatives from departments and no return to work unless it was voted upon by all the strikers.

The strikers unanimously adopted our program and refused, to a man, to accept the proposal of the Company union to return to work the next morning. Our comrades at this meeting were given the enthusiastic support of the strikers.

The Section leadership issued its second leaflet the next morning in the name of the Party. Again no word about the T.U.U.L. The contents of this leaflet, politically, were poor. Organizationally, the leaflet was weak. As a guide to action it was useless.

The conception of the tactic of the United Front was exemplified in one of the leaflets as follows: The workers of the Communist Party, Republican and Democratic parties were asked to unite their forces, but no mention was made of the Socialist Party workers. Our comrades explained "Why give publicity to the S.P.?"

When leading comrades went to the Section they were told: "Don't worry. We have the correct policy. We have our own policy."

When the Section was told to bring in the T.U.U.L., they said: "If the T.U.U.L. can't issue its leaflets, give its support, help financially, then it doesn't deserve to be even mentioned. The Party is doing all the work—therefore it must lead the strike."

By their policy of contempt for the T.U.U.L., by their stubborn refusal to consult the District leadership, by their sectarian approach to the workers, our comrades failed to gain influence among the strikers. The strikers were forced back to work by the company union thugs at a special meeting. They were forced to return on a 5 per cent increase with a promise of an additional 5 per cent in July.

Resentment among the workers towards this betrayal by the company union runs very deep. Our Party, with all the mistakes made, still has some influence among the strikers. Our comrades have established some good contacts. But the Section leadership, in its last leaflet, while it attacks the company union, still clings to the priority of the Party as the leader of the strike, again fails to mention the T.U.U.L.—but in the name of the Party and the Y.C.L. calls the workers to again go out on strike.

The A. F. of L. issues a leaflet—presents demagogically a program of struggle against the company union sell-out, and calls the workers to a mass meeting at night.

Our comrades issue a leaflet by the Party, with vague references to organizing another strike, but do not bring out the program of the T.U.U.L. and call their own meeting for the afternoon of the same day.

The Section leadership should be criticized sharply for

their attitude towards the correct Party policy and for their stubborn refusal to bring forward the program of the T.U. U.L.

The Section leadership should examine carefully its conduct in the light of the concrete experiences during the strike and draw the proper conclusions in line with the C.C. Resolution: "Agitation must be systematically carried on against company unions, all grievances inside the factory and all manifestations of discontent in the factories in which company unions exist must be utilized by the Communists and revolutionary workers in order to form and strengthen independent class trade unions, at the same time work must be carried on inside the company unions, striving to occupy every eligible post by Communists and militant workers for the purpose of winning the workers away from the company unions and for the organization of independent unions."

The task now is to systematically build up department committees and establish the leadership of the revolutionary trade unions, based on the program of the T.U.U.L., to win the workers completely away from the influence of the company union or A. F. of L. and prepare them for struggles on the basis of their most burning demands.

Work Among Lake Seamen

By JOHN ADAMS, *Chicago*

"THIS convention has revealed such forces that we must properly use to carry out among the masses more practical everyday work, collectively organized, collectively criticized, collectively checked up. . . ." Earl Browder, Eighth Convention report.

"Collective, practical work" means the solution of "how" to organizationally carry out the decisions of the convention. Can the Party lead united fronts? Can the "Red scare" be defeated or, better yet, used to our advantage? Are we practical leaders to follow? Will the false division of "Party work," of "union work" of "unemployed work" break down and properly flow as one onrushing torrent over the bourgeoisie?

The experiences of establishing organization among the seamen of Chicago, important steel trust seamen, have brought out some lessons that may be useful to other sections. This article deals with a period of one week.

The Party was not conducting any work among the Lake seamen in Chicago. About 250 jobless seamen were

waiting for ships in the Lake Carriers Hall (steel trust blacklist system).

The writer located a couple of sympathetic seamen in May, who were willing to help launch organizational activities. It was decided to call a mass meeting on the basis of a boycott against the L.C.A. that was taking place in Buffalo.

Fifty men responded. A report on the situation was made. The work of the M.W.I.U. was reported on. The men then participated in the discussion. They accepted the report. They stated that the idea of action against the L.C.A. was too advanced. The most outspoken voiced the sentiment that the proper approach to the men would be on unemployed relief. Only a few men were receiving flophouse relief. To get this, a letter from the shipping commissioner was necessary. The writer failed to heed the practical, collective expression of the men. They really were voicing the road to the mass of seamen. But the purpose of preparing action against the L.C.A. was kept in front. A small action did develop but only a few men took an interest in it.

With these few men, who carried on agitational work in the hall, a number of discussions took place. Some men joined the union. They asserted their opinions more resolutely. Two joined the Party.

It was decided to call a meeting on the code for the industry and relief. Only twenty men appeared. But by tackling the question of immediate action for relief, the meeting was of utmost importance. The men were made acquainted with the Baltimore struggle. The information as to national struggles being led by the M.W.I.U. was given them. Then the question of what to do was put to the meeting. The discussion immediately got down to concrete work.

A delegation to the F.E.R.A. officials was decided on. The next morning 25 men reported on time. Here the demands were again discussed. The organization of the delegation. How it was to conduct itself uptown. This was put up to the men. One proposal of the organizer was erroneous. The men saw the incorrectness of it and criticized it, voting it down. The details of the delegation were then collectively arrived at.

Uptown the officials received the delegation. For two and a half hours they conferred with the men. The men smashed through every demagogic statement of the officials.

After leaving the officials, a hasty meeting was held. The men reflected more confidence in their ability to mobilize their fellows and confidence in the leadership. They

spoke in terms of a hundred or two hundred men organizing in a few days.

For the next day's meeting time, one hundred men responded. They came in response to the word of mouth report. But we had brought back tangible victories. We had acted on a basic grievance. The men who reported showed confidence in us.

In two days 178 men registered with the committee for relief. Two hundred men came to the meeting, two days after the delegation uptown. Here the men endorsed the actions of the initiators. A broad committee of 25 to lead them was elected. This committee was elected for a period of two weeks but the M.W.I.U. organizer was elected **permanent chairman of all committees**. Why?

Before the meeting the shipping commissioner spread around rumors of "don't let these Reds fool you. Don't have anything to do with them." At the meeting one man asked "what have the Communists to do with this?"

The M.W.I.U. organizer, the writer, spoke on the Party. He "admitted" he was a Party member. Not only was the Party brought out to the men as being represented in the organization by membership, but the **leading role of the Party in this, a united front action and organization, was stressed**. The men in the hall applauded the concluding statement that "It is only because of our training and responsibility as Communists that we know how to start and lead organized struggles. We are members of the organization. Our Party guides us in our actions here. We must and will win many of you to join our Party. It is our Party that shows workers how to unite and fight for their betterment." A non-Party, new member rose and proposed a "vote of confidence" in the speaker and his election as permanent chairman. This passed unanimously.

Today nearly any sailor can answer the "Red scare" of rumor-mongers who would break the organization. They answer because they know the Party can and does lead sincere united fronts of workers. One of the leading committee members was under Socialist influence and today is almost ready to join our Party. Members of the A. F. of L. seamen's union are in our organization. They, too, are ready to join our union.

In the meeting, which was crucial, as here we had maybe the greatest number of seamen we would have at any meeting for some time, we brought forward the union as the leader of the marine struggles. The following of its program in unemployed struggles was stressed. The fact that the union would have to be built on the ships and ashore was emphasized.

The meeting gave concrete tasks to committee members. Actions, based on class struggle, recognition of relationship to the rest of the working class, were brought out.

The men began visiting their mates on the ships. The Party comrades, including the writer, were "too busy for a few days" to do Union work. We began to hear this. Individual men would approach us about visiting a ship. They wouldn't listen to "all right, on her next trip we'll be there." In meetings (we had over six in a week, with an average of 80 attendance) men began to demand action from the union. "We are losing members because somebody isn't on the job," one man stated, typical of others.

These men took very seriously and correctly the view that their shore struggle was but an allied struggle of the basic fight, on the ships. They saw a union in terms of thousands of members. By the end of the week, the situation was serious. We reacted sometimes twice a day to dangers in our unemployed work. Seven leaflets and bulletins rallying our seamen in crises were issued. At a mass meeting, one man angrily stated "I know that you have missed at least 30 members this week on the ships."

The Union comrades immediately put a member up to be the delegate. Men volunteered to help him by boarding the ships. The workers had collectively criticized us and given us the solution to our "difficulty".

We did not neglect to "work" on prospective Party members. It is interesting to note that about half of the ten men we are going to ask to join the Party in a meeting several days from now, have been also proposed to us by seamen as "there's a good guy you ought to get for your organization" (meaning the Party).

A meeting of 109 men adjourned to go to a mass meeting of steel workers, to express solidarity. They went in response to an invitation of the S.M.W.I.U. They went, knowing it might be necessary to defend the meeting against thugs.

What to do with the men who waited until gains were made? The most outstanding fighters of the organization have voluntarily waited their relief turn to put these men in front to, as one man said "teach these fellows that when we say **all** seamen, we mean it. Teach them that organization is for the benefit of all." Any tendency to condemn more backward workers was corrected in open meeting by the men themselves.

The organization protested the denial of an N.Y.D. permit to the youth. Discussions on the nationwide and world struggles receive good response. Men are asking for speakers on other working class struggles. Great interest in the Soviet Union is shown. Fifty copies of the **Daily Worker**, with the

Baltimore series, were distributed. Volunteers among the men took these out, selling quite a number. The small businessmen are contributing to the opening of a hall. The men want this hall for general social and educational purposes.

Every day there has been some kind of action. The men are responding in more disciplined organizational forms, created by themselves, to the daily calls.

We face serious opposition. Two clever attempts of the bosses and relief workers were smashed by the men, who also uncovered them.

We have met every problem that confronted us by taking it to the men. We know as Communists that we must fight on a class struggle platform. Organization execution, "how to do," is not a secret method locked up in our ranks. We have heeded advice, criticism, and suggestions of the men, collectively. We have kept the men in motion. We are accepted as leaders because of this. We drew strength from our applying the resolution of the Convention to the work. We know that the Party can lead masses of non-Party workers, even the most "backward", American workers, fresh in the fight. We will build a strong Party among these seamen. Our union will be the mass union of the seamen. We have to spread to the dock workers. Already we know that they want our organization here. The Party "line" is correct. The workers will prove this if we take it to them "collectively" and seek to bring it to them in practical terms of being the means of building their organizations and winning victories over the bourgeoisie.

Experiences of a Detroit Y. C. L. Shop Nucleus in Its Work in the A. F. of L.

By J. G., Detroit Y. C. L.

THE importance of exposing the bureaucracy of the reformist trade unions and their hand-in-glove method of work with President Roosevelt and his Labor Board has been stressed in the draft resolution for the National Convention of the Y.C.L.

The role of the A. F. of L. as a strikebreaking instrument in the general strike situation in the automotive industry of Detroit, Wisconsin, and Toledo has been properly exposed in the columns of the **Daily Worker**, leaflet distribution on factory fronts, and mass meetings in these districts.

As a direct result of this, the Y.C.L. and Party in the Detroit district raised three slogans on trade union work:

1. Build the Auto Workers' Union; 2. Build an opposition in the A. F. of L. and the Mechanics Educational Society; 3. Work in the company union.

The advice given is not only necessary but timely as well. Yet it is not specific enough nor is it concrete. In the past many of our comrades have applied this advice only when there has been a strike in the offing. "Into the trade union and out again" has been their action. This we must understand: to join the trade union means to stay in it and carry on consistent day-to-day work around the vital issues of the workers in the shop. And if again there threatens "general strike" in Detroit we will be on the inside instead of outside trying to get in.

There are certain specific and concrete directions that the Y.C.L. and Party nuclei of our shop worked out of its experience in building and putting into use an opposition in the A. F. of L. local of our shop.

1. **Every Y.C.L.'er a member of the dominant trade union in his shop.** This slogan has been raised innumerable times in the **Y.C.L. Builder**, trade union publications and the **Young Worker**. For a long time the comrades in our shop voiced the objection that in our local it was impossible for any rank and filer to gain the floor and a still greater impossibility to carry through worthwhile rank and file measures. The fact that occasions do arise, especially when strike sentiment is strong, when even the most dogmatic official and all his company henchmen cannot keep down rank and file discussion, was completely overlooked.

2. **Attend regularly the meetings of the local and the opposition.** This point seems rather obvious. Yet it has often been the policy of the comrades in our nucleus to attend the opposition meeting and then fail to follow through to the local's meeting, itself. The danger of this action was seen clearly when the members of the opposition lost faith in our comrades and a large number of them stopped attending the opposition meetings altogether.

3. **Cultivate the personal acquaintanceship of the members in the local.** The tendency of comrades to cultivate only these fellow trade unionists whose possibilities are those of becoming Communists was evident in the last general strike situation. In such a situation our comrades often have the appearance of a disrupter coming from the outside rather than rising out of the rank and file. They are not known to the membership at large nor to any but a very few of the most radical. They support and fight for only those measures directly supporting strike, unemployment relief, and sometimes cases of discrimination. Toward the measures supporting the general welfare of the union, they are deaf.

The value of knowing rank-and-file members was seen in our local when the president accused one of our members of not ever having worked in the plant. A rank and file member came to her support to assert otherwise, to say they had worked together in the same department. Instead of creating the desired effect of distrust in our comrade, it created rather a feeling of distrust toward the president.

4 **Be thoroughly familiar with the constitution.** Since the constitution and its sacred rules of order are the chief weapons used so ruthlessly and skillfully by the president and his officials to keep rank and filers from gaining the floor, to oust them from meetings, to call special meetings without the knowledge of the membership as a whole, and to delay strike action, the necessity for making a study of the constitution becomes self-evident. Once we had mastered the constitution, we were able to use it to our advantage, to check up on the officials in its use, and to force action on rank and file measures.

5. **Work as an organized fraction in the local.** This is the tool that when used with the above points; joining, attending, forming acquaintanceship of members, and knowledge of the constitution, becomes most powerful in developing and putting into action rank and file control in the reformist trade unions. It is the tool that breaks and defeats the thug and company control over strike action; the tool that turns the fake, strike-breaking A. F. of L. trade unions into militant trade unions fighting for rank and file demands.

Only when the Y.C.L.'ers in our shop nucleus, who were theoretically familiar with fraction work, began to put it into practice, were we able to realize its full possibilities. When we planned in our unit meetings the work in the opposition, deciding on measures to be brought up at the opposition meeting, planning the supporting speeches, and then organized the opposition as a whole into a functioning fraction in the local's meeting, we were able to send a telegram to the Governor of Ohio protesting the murder of Toledo workers, to send strike funds to Toledo, to secure indorsement by the local of the Workers Unemployment Insurance Bill, H.R. 7598, and to take steps for relief to laid-off workers.

This was done in a local whose membership registers 8,000 of the total 20,000 in the plant. This was done with an organized fraction in a local whose president was a former secret service man and who surrounds himself with plain clothes men and men hired by the company. This was the local in a shop where strike broke last year, where strike sentiment swept the plant this year with departmental strikes and stoppages of the line that gained raise after raise and a blanket 2 per cent raise to everyone in the plant. And yet at this time only one Y.C.L.'er was a member of the local.

Comrades, it was only because of our gross negligence that a strike that would have pulled out the whole plant did not take place, a strike that in all probability would have meant a general strike in the city of Detroit. An organized fraction in the local could have done this. In the future let none of us be guilty of overlooking the importance of work in the reformist trade unions.

How Can We Overcome Organizational Weaknesses?

By FRANK HELLMAN

IN the Communist International magazine which is now published in the U.S.A., we find in No. 1, Vol. 2, a review of the "Party Life" column conducted in the **Daily Worker**. It is pointed out there, that, while making the necessary criticism in connection with our organizational weaknesses it is important to show at the same time by concrete examples how to overcome them.

Some of the Main Shortcomings

Some of the main difficulties consist of lack of understanding of party structure and organization, lack of collective work and leadership, lack of individual responsibility and initiative, weak and badly functioning fractions, the missing of the group system in the units as well as insufficient orientation to build shop nuclei and the **Daily Worker** circulation, and lack of **Party Discipline**.

Results of these Weaknesses

As a result of all this, the percentage of fluctuation in the Party is quite high. This is true especially of our District. From the charts exhibited at the National Convention of our Party, the fluctuation in our District is more than 300%. Out of about 4500 workers brought into the Party since it was organized, we had in Feb. 1934, a little over 900 dues-paying members. Since July 1931 we recruited 2200 members. However, there are only 1200 members in the Party in this District (Philadelphia, Dist 3), now.

It is true that the fluctuation within the last year has been greatly reduced. However, it is still too large. Can we reduce it still further? I think we can. The question now arises, how can we do it? In the first place we must organize the group system in the units. This should be done in the following manner:

A street unit of let us say, 20 members is divided into

4 or 5 groups. Each group has one comrade, who is responsible for the activation of the members of this group. The captain or leader who is responsible must see to it that every one of his group attends the meetings of the unit. If one does not attend, he or she must report to the unit why the particular comrade is absent. The captain must then, if any of the comrades from his group are absent for legitimate reasons, carry back to the comrade his assignment and collect his dues. Each group is responsible for one part of the territory in which the unit operates. In the territory of each group, they distribute leaflets, they organize the **Daily Worker** campaign, they arrange open air and factory gate meetings, they sell literature and raise finances in this territory, they canvass the readers of our press and draw them into one of the organizations, and, since the readers of our press are potential Party members, it is they who should be brought into the Party.

New members recruited by the group, as well as others who may be recruited through the fractions but live in the place in which a particular unit operates, must be brought to the unit meetings by one of the members of the group until they become acquainted with the Party. Older party members must work with these new Party comrades, show them how work is to be done by practical examples, explain to them everything they do so they know why they are doing it and make it possible for them to explain to the workers generally why they do certain things. Each group must know what kind of factories there are in its territory, the composition of the workers in the factory. The Party members must know what the grievances of the workers in the factory are, etc. The unit buro must assemble all these facts and on the basis of this information link up all the Party campaigns with the life and conditions of the workers in the factories and the neighborhoods, and out of the activities of these groups there will grow new Party units.

Records of Dues Payment and Membership Are Very Important

We must overcome the indifference to technical problems. After returning from the convention, we requested the sections to check up how many Party members they had on record on the first of January, 1934, what their dues payment has been at that time and how many members they had on record on April 1st and what their dues payment was then. On the basis of that each section would be able to determine the fluctuation in the Party section, trace the causes and eradicate them. This was done several weeks ago. Up to this time we have not received from any of the sections a report on this important assignment of the

membership; either there is no systematic check up on the dues payment or they simply fail to respond. **This proves in any case lack of responsibility and indifference.** The figures are now being prepared by the Org. Dept. and we will, on the basis of the facts, demand to know from the Section Committee why there is no check up and no records in the Sections.

Shop Units Must Not Be Permitted to Become Stagnant

Within the past few months a number of shop nuclei were organized. Most of them however, do not yet function as a driving force in the shop in which they work. Some of them are small, but there is some work that can be done by all of them. Every Party member in the shop can speak to workers about conditions in the shop and make suggestions in line with the perspectives of the unit in the shop, speak about the corruption and conditions in the A. F. of L. unions, bring workers into the rank-and-file groups. If the shop is unorganized bring them into the revolutionary unions. Literature can be sold on trade union problems, on fascism, war, and above all the **Daily Worker**. The street unit can sell **Daily Workers** from the outside and also distribute leaflets in front of these shops. Members from the street units can also visit workers from the shop whom the Party comrades on the inside do not know well enough to approach for the Party. **Above all no Party unit can do effective work without a shop paper.**

In publishing the shop papers the Section and District Agitprops must help to guide the comrades politically in editing the papers. There is a danger that some of the shop nuclei organized within the last few months as a result of the struggles carried on in certain industries as well as those who were organized as a result of serious effort on the part of the Section Committees, will become stagnant. It is necessary that every member of the shop units be involved in certain work in order to make them feel that they have certain responsibilities. In planning the work for the section we must have in mind that the shop units are the driving axle of the Party and all Party campaigns must be planned accordingly.

Party Fractions

It ought to be understood by the whole Party membership that Communists who are members of a trade union, fraternal or any other organization, must be active in these organizations, because it is only as a result of their own activities that they are recognized as leaders in the particular organization in which they are active. Furthermore, Communists are not only responsible to the membership of

the organization in which they are active, but they are responsible for their activities to the Party at the same time.

Wherever one or more Communists belong to the same organization they must form a fraction. This fraction (i. e., Party members in the same organization and branch of an organization) must have regular meetings, discuss the problems of the organization and work out proposals to improve the work of the organization, plans to bring in the campaigns of Party, build the **Daily Worker** and recruit new Party members. Members of the fractions must at all times work together, support each other. They should, however, at all times convince the workers of the organization of the correctness of the proposals they make.

Top fractions must report regularly to the District Committee and fractions in the branches to the leading fraction and the Section Committee. The Party units must check up on the activities of every comrade and in the planning of the activities for the units, they must take into consideration the necessity of involving all the workers who are members of our organizations in the territory in which the unit operates, readers of our press, etc. This holds true especially in connection with the concentration policy of the unit or section as well as the District.

What Is the Present Situation?

A check-up by the Dist. Org. Dept. revealed that there are very few fractions functioning. In the trade unions, the fractions of the various unions, both A. F. of L. and T.U.U.L., function more or less, but, there is no functioning leading fraction. I. W. O. fractions are functioning very badly and are not organized. Clubs, Women's Leagues and other mass organizations have very weak or no fractions at all. This is the situation in Philadelphia. There is no doubt that out of town the situation is worse. Only the I.L.D. has a well-functioning top fraction and the best functioning fractions in the branches.

As a result of this we fail to mobilize the organizations we are active in, and, what is worse than that, Party comrades at the meetings of the mass organizations fight each other and disrupt instead of organizing the work of the organizations.

In Reading, for instance, where we have about 200 workers in various organizations, there were only 35 present at our May Day meeting and some of these were not members of Left-wing organizations. Such examples we can find in Washington and in our language organizations in Phila. All Sections therefore will have to assume greater responsibility, together with the Org. Committee of the District, in establishing the fractions.

The Question of Fluctuation Faces the Party and Demands Solution

By A. BENSON

THE first elementary organizational duty of the Communist Party members is to pay their dues regularly, every week. But the dues-paying figures show that the members have not yet learned this first fundamental organizational rule—at least as far as regularity is concerned.

Why has the Party adopted the weekly dues plan instead of the monthly? So as to bring every member into constant contact with the Party's basic organization: the shop or street unit. So as to make it easier for the members to pay the small amount weekly instead of accumulating a big amount every month. So as to enable the activization of the membership through the weekly attendance in the units, planning and discussing Party problems, and accepting and fulfilling the weekly assignments.

What do we find is actually happening? Members are not paying their dues regularly, every week. They accumulate 2, 3, 4, or more weeks of dues before they come to the unit meeting. They do exactly what the Party does **not** want done. To quote from the Party's Statutes, (see Page 2 of your membership book):

"A member of the Party can be (one) who is a member of a basic organization (unit) of the Party, who is **active** in this organization and **regularly** pays his membership dues"

We emphasize the regularity. Inactivity goes hand in hand with irregularity—of attendance and the dues payment.

To exemplify the above, let us take the weekly dues purchased by the districts from the Center for the month of April, 1934:

Average Dues-Paying Membership for April 1934

District	1st Week	2nd Week	3rd Week	4th Week
1	421	832	470*	326
2	5110	4638*	6235	6234
3	1058	1033	1042	1193
4	108	557	376*	397
5	516	770	658	700
6	1304	1898	1189*	1685
7	499	1155	657*	919

8	2297	2507	3512	2218*
9	1424	2530	2138	1416*
10	155	33*	167	258
11	300	151*	1124	990
12	826	1345	1897	663*
13	1497*	2459	2408	2598
14	438	709	362*	675
15	281	300	330	349
16	235	110*	—	—
17	692	419*	372	445
18	305	495	524	543
19	494	627	290*	826
20	60	80	70	76
21	195	230	330	294
22	150	50	—	—
23	80	38*	68	105
24	70	68	70	79
25	—	—	—	—

The asterisk () calls your attention to the extreme fluctuations between any two weeks . . . These examples demand explanations on the part of the districts, sections and units.

And when we take the monthly averages of the districts, we find these fluctuations reflected in an equally inexcusable manner:

Average Monthly Dues Paying Membership

District	Jan.	Feb.	Mar.	Apr.	May	New Recruits during the 4 months of
						Jan.-Apr.
1	922	542	789	513	687	161
2	4774	4094	6367	5554	5274	2132
3	1139	1244	1075	1082	1190	475
4	454	404	531	360	449	125
5	1087	1142	1012	661	1116	323
6	2076	1639	1675	1519	1390	562
7	1420	1105	865	808	925	222
8	3186	2484	3048	2634	2911	951
9	2656	1649	1920	1877	1451	332
10	409	261	229	155	130	70
11	553	489	306	642	243	122
12	1196	1605	1474	1183	1571	980
13	2236	2950	2134	2241	2128	1255
14	503	450	483	546	520	254
15	404	431	559	315	479	164
16	60	54	86	87	159	70
17	622	389	384	382	240	487
18	454	450	491	467	504	133

19	410	745	462	559	339	440
20	48	50	179	72	340	94
21	—	—	538	263	344	54
22	—	—	—	50	79	60
23	4	63	59	73	36	72
24	6	71	75	72	62	38
25	—	33	43	—	82	25
Total	24,727	22,344	24,784	22,115	22,649	9,601

All the financial secretaries of the units, sections and districts know—or should know—that the Party's policy on dues is: Every member must pay his dues every week. Every unit must buy every week the exact amount of stamps (in the exact denominations) as sold to the members at the unit meeting. Every section must buy the same number of stamps as sold to the units. Every district must buy the same number of stamps as sold to the sections.

Comparing these figures, and of course, taking into consideration the constant influx of the new recruits into our Party, the result should show a gradual average increase in the dues-paying membership every month. But when, and if, the dues payments do not reflect the Party's growth of over 2 000 new members each month, then we begin to ask: What's wrong? Where are the new members? Where are the old ones? Who is dropping out? Why? This demands the concentrated thought and solution on the part of the entire Party.

Do the members attend unit meetings every week? Every other week? Once a month? Or less often? Why? Do some come to unit meetings only when their membership books have to be controlled or exchanged? Which members? Why? What does the unit do with the new recruits? Are they only interested in making the contact with the prospective members, and remain so interested until they join the Party? After that do they immediately consider these full-fledged disciplined Communists, who take on and carry out their tasks regularly, or otherwise participate in the Party's activities? Or, if, by chance, these new members fail to attend 2, 3, 4, or more unit meetings in succession, does the unit bureau take notice? And what does it do about it? Or doesn't the unit bureau even miss these new members? Or does the unit bureau immediately send another member to see whether this new member is sick, or to find out the real cause of the new member's absence from the unit meetings? Or does the group system of the Party organization function in your unit? This group system, if properly worked, makes the closest contact between a few members of the unit, and thereby avoids delay in checking up on every comrade's activity, as well as his or her being in good-standing.

Excerpts from Report by Comrade F. Brown to C. C. on Organization and Fluctuation

WHAT has to be done to improve the recruitment, to concretize the slogan "double the recruitment power and cut the fluctuation in half"?

We must make a real drive to improve the political life of the units; which means that we must concretize into practice all decisions made previously on this problem: development of cadres, improvement of the discussion in the units, building of functioning unit buros, still further reduce the size of the Sections, improve our school system, etc. . . .

The experiences in Cleveland show the importance and necessity of Org. instructors in all the concentration Districts, an Org. instructor who will go down to the units, work out with them the plan of work, help in developing their initiative and show them practically how the work is to be done. If we do not use Org. instructors, on a Section and unit scale, we shall select some of the best comrades who, through their activities, show results, to go and help another section, another unit, for a little while.

Another problem to be solved is the issuing of a simple manual for lower functionaries. . . . Very probably we will need two kinds of manuals: one, for the best developed functionaries on a unit and Section scale and a still simpler one which will help the development of the new Party members, to acquaint them with the structure of our Party, with the main tasks of the units, with the role of the unit as the Party in a given shop or territory, with the nature and task of the fractions, etc.

The method used in Cleveland and other Districts of regular reports of the Org. Department to the District Buro must become a real institution. These reports not only will acquaint the leadership with the more minute organizational problems but will also stimulate the responsibility of the leadership towards the lower organization: the leadership will become more and more conscious of its task of concentrating below, on checking, also, on such problems as recruitment, fluctuation, circulation of the **Daily Worker**, activity of the Party members in the trade unions, etc.

It is already one year since we discussed the necessity of introducing the group system in the units, yet such a system is only on a very weak experimental stage. We must make up our minds that this system must be definitely established and the group captains will not only be responsible to lead the activities of the groups but also to collect the dues. In view of the difficulty of making a general decision and putting

it into effect overnight, we shall start with one section in each of the larger Districts where the leadership can check up continuously, improve the system, and extend it to the other sections. . . .

The unit must check up more consistently on the activities of all Party members who are active in the trade unions and other mass organizations and while striving to activate them in the units, at the same time in cases where the situation (as strikes and other mass struggles) prevents the comrades from attending their unit meetings regularly, a way must be found on how to obtain the dues payments from these comrades. (I mean members of the street units.)

There must be more discussion on the problems of recruitment and fluctuation in the leading committees and units. This discussion must be led through the Party Life column of the **Daily Worker**, the **Party Organizer** and articles in the Party press. The whole Party must feel that we are conducting a fight, that we are determined to make a real turn in increasing the recruitment and stop the fluctuation. . . .

We must reintroduce the initiations of the new members, introduce them into the life of the Party, so that these newcomers will feel at home, will feel a comradesly atmosphere.

Each District must regularly issue its own bulletins which will primarily mobilize the Party to carry out the control tasks set up by the District Committee. The bulletins will help the discussion in the units on many of the important organizational tasks, and in checking on the tasks set up in the plans of work and will stimulate competition.

The sections must compare weekly the dues paying membership on the unit roles. This will help not only in checking on the dues payments but also to see why comrades who appear on the roles do not participate at unit meetings, etc. This weekly check-up will spur the unit to find the reasons for the non-attendance of some of the Party members at unit meetings and, in this way, reactivate some of the elements who have decreased their activity.

We must prevent the units from becoming distributing agencies of all kinds of leaflets and papers. There are cases where the units, besides being very active in fulfilling one of their main tasks by distributing the Party leaflets, Party literature, the **Daily Worker**, are loaded with the distribution of material of the mass organizations, which should be distributed by the mass organizations themselves.

These are all measures which will help us in solving this burning problem. We must, however, have the apparatus which will orientate the lower units on this task, and help them to solve it. Three Districts, Chicago, Cleveland and Birmingham, decided to carry on a control of the membership with the aim not only of checking the fluctuation but of im-

proving the life of the units, raising the consciousness of all eligible members of trade unions to their Party task, etc. This is a good decision. We cannot, however, have a thorough and general control every three or six months. Such a control takes time, and, to some extent, if frequently applied, would hinder the activity of the units. Such control is correct only when the situation makes it necessary.

We came to the conclusion that all Districts should have a membership commission whose task will be to see that there shall be no delay in assigning the new members to the units, which will check up on the dues payments in the sections, in some of the units, will utilize the Party bulletins to popularize the good experiences, bring forward the weaknesses and methods which will help in stabilizing the dues payments, which will spur the competition between section and units in the recruiting drive, will call special meetings of the comrades assigned to the same task on section scale, will check up on the comrades in the trade union field, etc.

In conclusion, to bring before the Party the seriousness of this problem, stimulate the discussion in the units, popularize the experiences, the methods of how to improve the recruitment and check the fluctuation. We are also of the opinion that the small commission of the Central Committee should select one District for inspection, study the problem of recruitment and fluctuation concretely and upon the basis of a thorough examination of the experiences of this District, will dramatize before the whole Party this burning problem, will stimulate the whole Party in concretizing the three control tasks which will move the Party forward on the road to becoming a mass Party, able to lead millions:

1. Bring the good standing membership to 40,000 by the end of the year.
2. Increase the circulation of the **Daily Worker** to 75,000.
3. Make every Party member eligible to join a trade union, join the particular union of his trade.

The example of the Center should be followed by each District, building immediately the membership commission which will examine one of the sections, study all the experiences and work out the necessary measures for improving the recruitment and checking on fluctuation.

The carrying through of the three main organizational tasks is one of the main prerequisites to equip the Party to lead the struggles of millions of workers, to take hold of the spontaneous movement of the masses and turn it to its revolutionary political fullness.
